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In the present study we tested whether sense of agency (SoA) is reflected by changes
in coupling between right medio-frontal/supplementary motor area (SMA) and inferior
parietal cortex (IPC). Twelve healthy adult volunteers participated in the study. They
performed a variation of a line-drawing task (Nielsen, 1963; Fourneret and Jeannerod,
1998), in which they moved a cursor on a digital tablet with their right hand without seeing
the hand. Visual feedback displayed on a computer monitor was either in correspondence
with or deviated from the actual movement. This made participants uncertain as to the
agent of the movement and they reported SoA in approximately 50% of trials when
the movement was computer-generated. We tested whether IPC-preSMA coupling was
associated with SoA, using dynamic causal modeling (DCM) for induced responses (Chen
et al., 2008; Herz et al., 2012). Nine different DCMs were constructed for the early and
late phases of the task, respectively. All models included two regions: a superior medial
gyrus (preSMA) region and a right supramarginal gyrus (IPC) region. Bayesian models
selection (Stephan et al., 2009) favored a model with input to IPC and modulation of the
forward connection to SMA in the late task phase, and a model with input to preSMA and
modulation of the backward connection was favored for the early task phase. The analysis
shows that IPC source activity in the 50–60Hz range modulated preSMA source activity in
the 40–70Hz range in the presence of SoA compared with no SoA in the late task phase,
but the test of the early task phase did not reveal any differences between presence and
absence of SoA. We show that SoA is associated with a directionally specific between
frequencies coupling from IPC to preSMA in the higher gamma (G) band in the late task
phase. This suggests that SoA is a retrospective perception, which is highly dependent on
interpretation of the outcome of the performed action.
Keywords: sense of agency (SoA), supplementary motor area (SMA), right inferior parietal cortex (IPC), dynamic
causal model (DCM), γ-activity in SMA-IPC network
INTRODUCTION
When we reach for a cup of coffee we usually feel that we are
in control of what we are doing and that we are the agent of
the movement. Current research suggests that the sense of agency
(SoA) occurs when the sensory consequences (usually in the form
of proprioceptive and visual feedback) of the movement corre-
spond to the original intention and plan of the movement, i.e.,
the comparator model (Gallagher, 2000; Wegner, 2004; Engbert
et al., 2008). The comparator model fits within the experimental
framework of feedback manipulations, in which (typical) visual
feedback is distorted in such a way that there is a mismatch
between visual and proprioceptive feedback, and thereby also a
mismatch between the intended action outcome and the visual
feedback.
The most common way to study the SoA is to expose partici-
pants to a situation of ambiguity regarding self-produced move-
ment. This may be done by manipulating the visual feedback that
a participant receives regarding performance of a simple hand or
armmovement. Nielsen (1963) introduced the first version of this
experimental design (known as the Alien Hand paradigm). He
was not interested in SoA per se, but rather the feeling of voli-
tion, which is essential for SoA (Nielsen, 1963). These types of
manipulations also allow participants to focus on the judgmen-
tal task of determining whether they themselves or an external
agent performed the action (Farrer et al., 2003a). Such tasks have
led to the notion of a “who”-system (Georgieff and Jeannerod,
1998), which is used in the process of determining “who” is the
agent. Several later studies have adapted the paradigm to inves-
tigate intentional actions and the neural mechanisms underlying
SoA (e.g., Fourneret and Jeannerod, 1998; Farrer and Frith, 2002).
However, recent studies suggest that unexpected outcomes of
actions are associated with high sense of control if the action lead-
ing to the response is compatibly primed (Chambon et al., 2013;
Sidarus et al., 2013), suggesting that SoA depends on prospec-
tive forms of knowledge relating to action selection processes, and
independent of action outcome.
However, the neural circuitry responsible for the experience of
agency has not been fully clarified in terms of how brain regions
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interact and the temporal aspect of activities in specific cortical
structures. Several studies have implied that areas in the infe-
rior parietal cortex (IPC) and areas in the supplementary motor
area (SMA) are involved in the formation of intentions prior to
the movement and evaluation of action outcomes (Sirigu et al.,
1999, 2004; Leube et al., 2003; Farrer et al., 2008; Desmurget
et al., 2009). Patients with lesions of the posterior parietal cortex
(PPC) more often mistake whether they are or an experimenter
is responsible for a movement shown on a video screen (Sirigu
et al., 1999) and they become aware of their decision with a
significant delay compared to healthy participants (Sirigu et al.,
2004). Electrical stimulation of the right inferior parietal lobe
(IPL) may also make participants falsely believe that they moved
or intended to move (Desmurget and Sirigu, 2009), while stimu-
lation of the SMA has been reported to produce an urge to move
(Fried et al., 1991). Imaging studies have demonstrated activation
in the preSMA and in the right angular gyrus (part of the IPC)
when participants experience a discrepancy between intended
and observed movements (Farrer and Frith, 2002; Farrer et al.,
2008; Yomogida et al., 2010; Nahab et al., 2011; Chambon et al.,
2013), which also shows parametric modulations when devia-
tions are increased gradually (Farrer et al., 2003a). Interruption
of preSMA by transcranial magnetic stimulation demonstrated
disruption of agency (Moore et al., 2010). While these studies
provide evidence of the involvement of the respective areas in
the generation of the subjective SoA, they reveal nothing about
the functional or effective connectivity or the temporal aspect
of neural communication in the parietal-SMA network involved
in SoA.
In order to elucidate these issues we conducted the present
EEG-study of the time course of coupled activity in the right IPC-
preSMA network in relation to SoA. The analysis of the study was
explorative. However, we hypothesized a modulation of activity
between the selected target regions depending on behavior of the
participant and the reflective task the participants were exposed
to in a modified version of the Alien-Hand Paradigm (Nielsen,
1963). The connectivity between the two regions of interest was
disclosed using a dynamic causal model (DCM) (Chen et al.,
2008) for induced responses, in which a BayesianModel Selection
(BMS) was used to select the DCM, which explains the activ-
ity in right IPC and preSMA and how these are coupled best.
The DCM describes how the neural activity, in terms of oscil-
latory power of one brain region, modulates the activity, again
in terms of oscillatory power, of another region. This was inves-
tigated in relation to a motor task in which participants were
asked to judge whether they themselves were responsible for a
cursor movement presented on a computer screen, or whether
a computer was responsible. Previous studies have shown that
conscious perception of visual input is associated with coupling
of neural activity across cortical areas in the G-band frequency
range (Rodriguez et al., 1999; Engel et al., 2001; Palva et al.,
2005; Melloni et al., 2007; Siegel et al., 2012). Furthermore,
investigations of EEG activity in relation to SoA have focused
on modulation of event related potentials (Balconi and Crivelli,
2009; Gentsch et al., 2012), showing increased N1 components
for externally-generated visual feedback and increased ERP com-
ponents around 100ms for delayed visual feedback respectively.
However, to our knowledge no studies have looked at oscilla-
tory coupling in relation to SoA We hypothesized that a network
with information flow from preSMA-IPC would be favored in the
initial phase of the movement, indicating that formation of inten-
tion of the action is formed in frontal regions and fed to parietal
regions for later comparison between intended and actual move-
ment outcome. Hence, opposite direction of information flow
would be favored in the late phase of the task.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
We included 12 right-handed, healthy adults (10 men/2 women)
ranging from 22–32 years (average: 26.4 ± 2.8 years). None of
the participants had any history of neurological or psychiatric
disorder. Two male participants were excluded from the analysis
after initial inspection of the data files revealed that they displayed
very odd subjective reports of agency, i.e., reporting YES (or NO)
in more than 80% of all trials. Ten participants were therefore
included in the analysis. All participants were given written and
oral information and all signed a consent form before the start of
the experiment. The experiment was carried out according to the
Helsinki-declaration andwith approval from the local ethics com-
mittee of the Capital Region of Copenhagen (protocol number:
H-B-2009-17).
EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURE
The experimental paradigm was adapted from Ritterband-
Rosenbaum et al. (2011) and aimed to cause ambiguity as to
whether the participant or a computer was responsible for mov-
ing a cursor on a computer screen (Ritterband-Rosenbaum et al.,
2011). The participants were seated comfortably in a chair with
their heads in chin-rests 55 cm away from a computer screen.
Vision of participants’ own hands was blocked during the entire
experiment (see Figure 1). Participants were instructed to make
a fast (within 1.5 s) straight movement in the sagittal plane away
from the center of their body by moving a cursor with a pen on a
pen-tablet (Wacom, Intuos 3, Krefeld, Germany). The task was
presented in a custom made Matlab (The MathWorks, Natics,
MA, USA) program. A cue appeared on the screen indicating
when participants were to start the movement. Participants had
to move the cursor from the starting position at the bottom of
the screen to the target at the top of the screen. When reaching
the vertical level of the target, the cursor disappeared and par-
ticipants had to report as fast as possible (within 1.5 s) whether
they felt themselves as the agents of the observed movement. This
was done by a key press of either the index finger (“yes, it is me”)
or middle finger (“no, it is not me”) of the left hand. After the
key press the participants had 2 s to place the pen to be ready for
next trial. Each trial lasted 7 s. All participants performed 2 blocks
of 200 trials (25min) interrupted by a small break of 2–5min to
assure participants were attentive.
Three types of experimental trial types were introduced:
Computer manipulated movements, Self-generated movements
(trials with no interference of the computer on the observed
movement), and Pause trials. The computer manipulated move-
ments consisted of trials where the visual feedback was manip-
ulated 1, 3, 6 (right), −1, −3, and −6 (left) degrees away from
target (Figure 1), i.e., in parametrical fashion as done previously
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FIGURE 1 | The experimental design. (A) Displays the position of the
participants during the experiment. The plate below the chin blocks the
view of the hands but participants can follow the consequence of the action
on the screen in front of them. (B) Illustrates what is occurring on the
computer screen. During the experiment the cursor was randomly
manipulated from the beginning of the movement by different angles of
(−6, −3, −1, 1, 3, 6◦). Negative angles refer to manipulation to the left side
of the target. Participants had max. 1.5 s to perform the movement, but
were instructed to move fast. When reaching the level of the target, the
visual object disappeared and participants had to report as fast as possible
(within 1.5 s) whether or not they felt they were the agents of the observed
movement by a key press of the index or middle finger of the left hand.
After key press, participants had 2 s to place the pen on top of the visual
object and be ready for the next trial. During the experiment there were no
lines visible on the display screen.
in other studies (Fourneret and Jeannerod, 1998; Farrer et al.,
2003a,b). The 3/−3◦ manipulations were presented 80 times, the
other angles 40 times. The self-generated movements and Pause
trials were presented 40 times each. The Pause trials initially dis-
played the instruction “Pause” on the screen, after which the cur-
sor moved to the target while participants did not move the hand.
The trials were presented in a random order, though the order was
the same for all participants. The computer-manipulations were
induced from the beginning of the movement and continued in
a straight line to the predefined position at the same level as the
target. The dimensions of the tablet were 310 × 238mm and the
dimensions of the screen were 380 × 303mm (with a resolution
of 1280 × 1024 pixels). Moving 1 cm on the tablet corresponded
to 1.2 cm horizontally and 1.3 cm vertically on the screen. The
cursor was placed centrally 20% from the bottom of the screen
with a diameter of 0.2 cm. To reach the target, which was located
centrally 20% from the top of the screen, participants had tomove
approximately 15 cm on the tablet, which could easily be done
without moving the full body.
We aimed to findmovement deviation, which corresponded to
50/50% self-reported agency distribution. Pilot experiments indi-
cated that this ratio was obtained at −3/3◦ deviations; therefore
we exposed the participants to a higher number of −3/3◦ trials,
but in the actual series of experiments the angle of deviation at
which this ratio was found differed between participants, and as a
consequence data from all angle deviations were pooled across all
participants. Trials where the time of the answer was longer than
the allowed response time (1.5 s) were excluded from the analysis
(1.8% of all trials were excluded corresponding to less than 5.3%
from 1 of the participants, less than 2.8% from 9 of the partici-
pants, and 0% from 2 participants). A total of 2972 trials with a
ratio of roughly 50/50 for agency/no agency reporting were used
in the EEG analysis (see also section EEG data analysis for further
description). For individual participants the ratio varied from 13
to 72% for agency attribution with an average ratio for attributing
the movement to one self of 42%.
DATA ACQUISITION
Continuous EEG was recorded from 64 channels (ActiveTwo,
BioSemi, Amsterdam, The Netherlands) using acquisition soft-
ware ActiView (version 6.05). Active electrodes were mounted in
a headcap (headcap BioSemi, The Netherlands). Off-set was kept
below 25microV. Recordings were set to AC and 1Hz high-pass
filtering applied. Sampling rate was 2048Hz. Markers indicat-
ing onset of movement, end of movement, and key-press when
reporting experience of agency were co-registered with the EEG.
EEG DATA ANALYSIS
All data were analyzed offline using Matlab R2010a (MathWorks,
MA, USA), with the toolbox EEGLab v9.0.4.4b (Swartz Center for
Computational Neuroscience; http://sccn.ucsd.edu/eeglab/), and
the toolbox Statistical Parametric Mapping (SPM8).
Files were imported to EEGlab, resampled to 256Hz in order
to reduce computation time, re-referenced to average reference.
Then 1Hz high-pass and 80Hz low-pass filters were applied.
Independent Component Analysis (ICA) was applied using the
runica algorithm. ICA components reflecting eye-blinks and lat-
eral eye-movements were identified by visual inspection and
subsequently removed from the data. If noise components that
were visible as noise across the whole scalp image were identified,
these were also removed from the data. The EEG data without
eye movement and common noise artifacts were exported from
EEGlab to BDF-format files.
The new BDF files were imported into SPM8. Data were
epoched from −500 to +1000ms with respect to movement
onset for each trial. The epochs were sorted into AgencyYES and
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AgencyNo trials. All epochs were visually inspected and in trials
with spikes or similar artifacts were declared as “BAD” and left out
of further analysis. On average 8% of all epochs were excluded.
The epoched data were then taken into an initial source
image analysis using empirical Bayes Methods as implemented
in SPM8. EEG data were co-registered with a template T1-
weighted magnetic resonance image, and a forward model was
constructed using a Boundary Element Model. The forward
model was inverted using the multiple sparse priors as hyper pri-
ors. Data were limited to a time window from 0ms to +800ms
with respect to movement onset. Furthermore, the data were
limited to frequencies between 4 and 80Hz. Images of the recon-
structed sources were separated into an early (0–400ms) and
late (400–800ms) task phases, and divided into delta (4–7Hz),
alpha (8–14Hz), beta (15–30Hz), low G (31–50Hz) and high
G (51–80Hz) frequency ranges, based on textbook frequency sep-
arations which are supposed to reflect different functional prop-
erties related to alertness, motor control, attention, conscious
thoughts, etc., and into AgencyYES and AgencyNO conditions.
Studies suggest that conscious perception depends on transient
synchronized activity at frequencies around 30–60Hz; We there-
fore found it important to look at different frequency bands
and to further separate the G-band into low and high ranges
(Rodriguez et al., 1999; Engel et al., 2001; Palva et al., 2005;
Melloni et al., 2007). We chose to separate the early and late task
phases as we believed that the two time periods are related to dif-
ferent events of the task presented. The early phase governs the
movement as such, whereas the late phase represents evaluation
of the movement and therefore a different modulatory activity.
These images, reconstructed for each participant, were taken into
a second level 3-way ANOVA analysis. An F-test was made across
all conditions, i.e., the mean of all conditions. Results from this
source analysis gave rise to an image of areas that were used to
guide the subsequent Dynamic Causal Model (DCM) analysis.
Furthermore, we performed a test of the main effect of agency
on the source analysis images which was also used to guide the
DCM analysis and tests of the main effects of time and frequency.
DCM for induced responses (Chen et al., 2008) was used in
order to assess within-frequency and between-frequency coupling
between medial frontal and right inferior parietal regions. We
were particularly interested in the differences in coupling between
the AgencyYES and AgencyNO trials. We therefore tested whether
or not ascribing the visually perceived action to one-self would be
reflected in different coupling patterns in a network of regions
involved in this action.
We selected two regions that have been implicated in motor
tasks that include judgments of agency. These were a medial
frontal region and right IPC. Two loci, which were used as
prior for the DCM source reconstruction procedure, were cho-
sen based on the clusters found in the imaging source analy-
ses (Figure 2) described above. These were: right fronto-medial
region (preSMA, superior medial gyrus, MNI coordinate: 12, 26,
56) based on the source analysis of the mean across all conditions
in the above described ANOVA, and right inferior parietal region
(supramarginal gyrus, IPC(PGa), MNI coordinate: 60, −50, 18)
based on the analysis of the positive main effect of Agency, i.e.,
Agency YES > Agency NO. These two regions were used in the
subsequent DCM analyses. Furthermore, two different sets of
models were constructed, one corresponding to the early part of
the task (1–400ms), and one corresponding to the late part of the
task (400–800ms), covering the time when participants evaluate
their movement.
Nine different DCM were constructed from the data from the
early task phase (1–400ms time window) and nine DCMs from
the late task phase (400–800ms). All models included the right
preSMA (MNI: 12, 36, 56) and right IPC (MNI: 60, −50, 18)
regions. Two types of effects were constructed: the AgencyYES
and AgencyNO trials, i.e., SoA condition. These effects were
allowed to enter either one or both of the regions; the effects
could either influence the coupling from the frontal to the pari-
etal region, the coupling from the parietal to the frontal, or both
couplings at the same time. In all models information can “flow”
between both regions, but it is the information about SoA that
influences the models differently. In models 1–3, SoA can influ-
ence both connections between the regions; in models 4–6 it is
only information flowing from IPC to preSMA that is influenced
by SoA, and in models 7–9 it is only information flowing from
preSMA to IPC that is influenced by SoA. Models 1, 4, and 7 are
similar with respect to where information about SoA should enter
the models, in these cases into both IPC and preSMA. Models 2,
5, and 8 are similar in the sense that information enters preSMA,
and inModels 3, 6, and 9 information enters IPC. If any ofModels
1–3 are favored by a Bayesian Model Selection (BMS) analyses
it indicates that SoA is a process that requires that information
between IPC and preSMA has to be reiterated between the two
regions. If any of Models 4–6 are favored in a BMS it indicates
that intentional information about the predicted consequences
of the action, formed in preSMA, is modulated by SoA, and if
any of Models 7–9 are favored by a BMS it indicates that actual
sensory consequences, or deviations between expected and actual
consequences, computed in IPC are modulated by SoA. If mod-
els 1, 4, or 7 are favored it indicates that SoA is “generated”
simultaneously in IPC and preSMA, which would mean that any
distinction of whether SoA depends mainly on information about
the intention of the movement or depends on the outcome of
the comparison between expected and actual feedback remains
unresolved.
For this DCM for induced responses we chose a non-linear
coupling, i.e., allowing between-frequency coupling in the range
between 4–80Hz, because this allows modeling both within-
frequency coupling and between frequency coupling. This choice
was made because “Agency” as a phenomenon incorporates
aspects of motor control as well as aspects of conscious self-
recognition, and these behaviors are not necessarily associated
with EEG oscillations at the same frequencies. These combina-
tions gave rise to the nine different DCMs displayed in Figure 4,
which then was constructed for the two different task phases
(early and late).
In order to determine which of the two times nine models
explained the data best, we conducted two separate fixed effect
BMS analyses, one for the early task phase (1–400ms) and one
for the late task phase (400–800ms).
The models that explained the data best selected from the two
BMS of the early task phase and late task phase respectively were
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FIGURE 2 | Source localization. (A) Shows the main effect across all
conditions (p < 0.05 FWE corrected for multiple comparisons). Red
arrow points to the location used for the DCM analysis for the preSMA
source. (B) Shows the main effect of agency (p < 0.05 uncorrected
threshold). Red arrows point to the location used for the DCM analysis
for the IPC source. (C) Shows the main effect of time (i.e., early vs.
late) (p < 0.05 uncorrected threshold) (arrow in MNI 0,0,0). (D) Shows
the main effect of frequency (p < 0.05 uncorrected threshold). Red
arrow points to the location used for the DCM analysis for the preSMA
source.
used for subsequent comparisons. Here the coupling between the
frontal and parietal regions was tested using paired t-tests. The
t-tests compared the frequency-frequency images of the effect of
trials on the coupling derived from the respective model.
BEHAVIORAL DATA ANALYSIS
Only data from trials with manipulated angles were used for anal-
ysis. Group averages were done after separating data depending
on the experience of agency for the different kinematical results.
Each trial contains Xpen, Ypen coordinates for each individual
movement produced by the pen on the tablet, and Xcursor, Ycursor
coordinates for the trajectory of the cursor on the screen. Each
complete set of coordinates was normalized to the size of the
pen-tablet and used for further calculations of the kinematic:
(1) Movement time (ms): refers to the time to complete the
movement. Movement time is calculated by the start of the
movement to the final point on the screen where the visual
object reaches the vertical level of the target.
(2) Hit distance (mm): corresponds to the distance between the
end position Xpen and Xtarget center of the target. Negative
and positive values indicate hit distances on the left side and
right side of the target, respectively.
(3) Line curvature (mm−1): indicates how curved the actual
movement is. It was based on a calculation of the relative
distance between the produced movement and the shortest
distance to the target. The curvature measure for this purpose
is the accumulated local curvature for the entire movement.
A lower score represents a more direct movement toward the
target. It is calculated by the formula.
C = x
′
y
′′−y′ x′′(
x′2+y′2
)3/2
(4) Drift (mm): measures the difference between the move-
ment of the pen on the tablet and the observed cursor
movement trajectory on the computer screen. Small values
indicate good correspondence between the produced and
the observed movement. It was calculated as the Eucledian
distance between the Xpen,Ypen and the Xobject,Yobject
drift =
√
(xpen−xscreen)2+(ypen−yscreen)2
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(5) Answer time (ms): indicates the time from the end of the
movement until participants pressed a button to indicate
whether they experienced agency or not.
Paired T-tests for the behavioral data were used and the alpha
level set at 0.05. For non-normally distributed data a Mann-
Whitney Rank Sum Test was applied.
RESULTS
BEHAVIORAL FINDINGS
Table 1 reports the kinematics of the performed movement in
relation to the subjective experience of agency. The movement
time (Mann-Whitney Rank Sum: 49.0, p = 0.97), the line cur-
vature (Mann-Whitney Rank Sum: 47.0, p = 0.583), the hit
distance (Mann-Whitney Rank Sum: 49.0, p = 0.970), the drift
(Mann-Whitney Rank Sum: 37.0, p = 0.345) and the answer
time (t = −0.058, p = 0.477) were all very similar whether the
participants experienced agency or not.
Table 1 provides information about group averages of kine-
matic results separating data into the subjective reporting. Inter-
participant variance is given by 1 SD.
SOURCE LOCALIZATION
The initial image source localization analysis demonstrated sig-
nificant sources (F-test, across all conditions, voxel threshold
p < 0.05 Family Wise Error (FWE) corrected for multiple com-
parisons using Gaussian random field theory, limited to cortical
areas associated with gray matter as defined by the SPM anatomy
toolbox v1.8) in the right inferior temporal gyrus, right superior
parietal lobule (angular gyrus, superior occipital gyrus, middle
occipital gyrus, precuneus), left superior parietal lobule (angu-
lar gyrus, middle occipital gyrus), bilateral IPC (supramarginal
gyrus), right inferior and medial temporal gyrus, left inferior
occipital gyrus, bilateral inferior frontal gyrus, left inferior tem-
poral gyrus and temporal pole, bilateral superior medial and
superior frontal gyrus (see Figure 2A).
Exploratory source localization analyses
Themain effect of agency showed significant differences in source
strength in bilateral IPC (supramarginal gyrus) albeit at a lenient
(p < 0.05 uncorrected) threshold (see Figure 2B) which was used
for the subsequent DCM analysis.
The main effect of task phase (early vs. late) revealed signifi-
cant albeit at a lenient threshold (p < 0.05 uncorrected) source
differences in early visual areas and along the dorsal stream
(Figure 2C).
Table 1 | Kinematic for all deviations divided into the two categories
of subjective reporting.
Yes No
Movement time (ms) 332±49 327±52
Hit distance (mm) −24.2±37.4 −25.4±37.2
Line curvature (mm−1) 0.033±0.008 0.032±0.007
Drift (mm) 43.8±26.9 51.2±27.5
Answer time (ms) 492±119 489±132
The main effect of frequency revealed significant albeit at a
lenient threshold (p < 0.05 uncorrected) sources in frontal areas,
including the preSMA region, which was used for the subsequent
DCM analysis.
Because DCM for EEG incorporates a generative model of the
sources that are modeled, these initial source localization analyses
are not necessary for the specification of the models. The statis-
tics underlying the sources are not crucial for the specification of
the DCM, since the DCM tests specific hypotheses concerning the
sources incorporated in the model, and not an unspecific hypoth-
esis concerning any combination of sources in the data. Therefore,
these source analyses serve only as guidelines for the loci used in
the DCM analyses. As part of the DCM for induced responses, we
also employed a step that optimizes source localization. This opti-
mization is based on the initial loci given, but allow for deviations
away from the exact loci. The above mentioned source localiza-
tion analyses of the three main effects serve only as an exploratory
test for guidance.We based the IPC and preSMA loci for the DCM
on the initial explorative source analyses. However, values based
on previous studies would be an alternative, which would serve
the same purpose.
DYNAMIC CAUSAL MODEL FIT
The nine models (Figure 3), as described in the methods sections,
were constructed for all 10 participants and underwent model
inversion in SPM8 for the early and late task phase separately. For
the early task phase data, all model inversions revealed models
that showed time-frequency plots reflecting a simplified version
of the actual data (see Supplementary Figure S1, which compares
data from the two sources with the predictions derived from the
models). For the late task phase, model inversions from one par-
ticipant resulted in nine models without any dynamics, and hence
the participant’s models were not included in the subsequent BMS
for the late phase.
BAYESIAN MODEL SELECTION
The BMS revealed that Model 8 was the winning model for the
early task phase, whereas Model 6 was the model that fitted the
data best for the late task phase (Figure 3). Model 8 for the early
task phase is the model in which information about SoA is fed
into preSMA, and where SoA modulates the connection from
preSMA to IPC. Model 6 for the late task phase is the model in
which information about SoA is feed into IPC, and where SoA
modulates the connection from IPC to preSMA.
DYNAMIC CAUSAL MODEL OF INDUCED RESPONSES
For the early task phase, where Model 8 was the winning model,
the frequency-frequency maps of the couplings from preSMA to
IPC revealed no significant (p > 0.05 FWE cluster level corrected)
(Figure 4A) differences between the AgencyYES and AgencyNO
conditions.
For the late task phase, where Model 6 was the winning model,
the frequency-frequency maps of the couplings from IPC to
preSMA revealed significant differences between the AgencyYES
and AgencyNO conditions (p < 0.05 FWE cluster level cor-
rected). When the power of frequencies in the range from 50–
60Hz in IPC increased, the power in the frequencies 40–70Hz
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FIGURE 3 | Dynamic causal models. (A) Shows location of the two sources
used for the DCM analyses in right medial frontal gyrus ∼preSMA and right
supramarginal gyrus ∼IPC. (B) Shows the 9 different DCMs, and (C) the
results of the Bayesian model selection for the early phase (marked in green
square) and late phase (marked in blue square) of the movement
(400–800ms).
increased more in preSMA (Figure 4B) for AgencyYES than for
AgencyNO.
DISCUSSION
In the present study we have investigated SoA and showed that
during a simple goal directed computer cursor movement task,
a network consisting of two cortical areas that are believed to
be involved in SoA display different coupling patterns depending
on the state of the movement. Using DCM and BMS, we have
shown that the early and late phases of the task are governed
by two different processes as revealed by two different dynamics
causal models that explain the data best (Model 8 vs. Model 6).
Furthermore, we have shown that only in the late phase of the
task, the positive SoA, i.e., “yes I am responsible for the action
that I have witnessed on the screen in front of me,” is reflected
in a change in between-frequency coupling directed from IPC to
preSMA in the higher G frequency range. We interpret these find-
ings in the light of the comparator model in such a way that the
preSMA processes the intended outcome of the action, and the
IPC is used in sensory integration of the visual and propriocep-
tive feedback. In the case of correspondence of the comparison
between the intended outcome of the action and actual feed-
back, communication between preSMA and IPC is governed by
the increased gamma coupling, which thereby becomes essen-
tial in order to form SoA because information about a successful
comparison has been achieved. The increase in gamma cou-
pling in the direction from IPC to preSMA may suggests that
information about the outcome of the corresponding comparison
also is fed back to preSMA in order to update intention formation
in preSMA as the specific goal of the action now is accomplished.
LOCALIZATION, TIMING, AND NEURAL ACCOUNTS OF SoA
These two findings suggest on the one hand that information pro-
cessing in the neural network underlying the early parts of a goal
directed movement is a process that preferentially involves infor-
mation flow from frontal toward parietal areas, as revealed by
the results of the Bayesian model selections. Later, the occurrence
of SoA seems to require information about the outcome of the
action in order to occur as reflected in coupling with an informa-
tion flow from parietal to frontal areas. This is consistent with the
idea that IPC computes the discrepancy between the intended and
actual outcome of the movement performed. Theoretical aspects
of SoA imply that a central monitoring system is available in
order to estimate congruency or incongruency between motor
performance and sensory feedback. This comparator model uses
predictions of motor output and actual estimated state of move-
ment (Wolpert et al., 1995; David et al., 2008; Synofzik et al.,
2008). This discrepancy is reflected in the larger change in cou-
pling from IPC to preSMA in AgencyYES than that in AgencyNO.
This is further reflected in the modulation of oscillatory power in
preSMA in the 40–70Hz range by increases in oscillatory power
in IPC in the range from 50–60Hz.
Although the non-specificity of EEG does not permit a precise
localization of the signals, we have used approximate source loci
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FIGURE 4 | Frequency-Frequency coupling in winning models. Results
of the DCM analysis frequency-frequency paired t-tests. (A) Shows the
results of the paired t-test of Frequency-pairs for the early task phase,
testing whether the coupling from preSMA to IPC is significantly (p < 0.05
FWE cluster level, based on p < 0.05 uncorrected tests of individual
frequency pairs) different for AgencyYES compared with AgencyNO trials.
(B) Shows the results of the paired t-test of Frequency-pairs for the late
task phase, testing whether the coupling from IPC to preSMA is
significantly (p < 0.05 FWE cluster level, based on p < 0.05 uncorrected
tests of individual frequency pairs) different for AgencyYES compared with
AgencyNO trials, which is the case in the 50–60Hz frequency range for
IPC, which then increases the power in the frequencies 40–70Hz increases
in preSMA more for AgencyYES compared with AgencyNO.
for IPC and preSMA, respectively. In general, EEG source local-
ization cannot be used with the same precision as, for instance,
fMRI to determine where specific activity is located in the brain.
It is therefore also important to stress that the source localiza-
tions performed in this study are of exploratory nature, and that
the main effect of SoA reflected as a significant, albeit at very
lenient threshold, only indicates that IPC may be related directly
to SoA. This may also suggest that the approach to look for neu-
ral signatures related to SoA is more likely to be found reflected
in the network coupling changes rather than in changes in a sin-
gle brain region. The IPC has been suggested as important for
the conscious intention to move (Sirigu et al., 2004; Desmurget
and Sirigu, 2009), and lesions including this area induce an inabil-
ity to recognize visual feedback of one’s own movements (Sirigu
et al., 1999). This is well in line with the larger coupling that we
observed when participants experienced agency. Farrer and Frith
(2002), Farrer et al. (2008) suggested that activity in the angu-
lar gyrus, which is part of the IPC, is mainly involved in the
rejection of agency. In our study this would be the case when par-
ticipants realized that the computer rather than they themselves
was responsible for the movement. This is not in conflict with
our findings, since coupling between two areas says little about
the overall activity of the involved areas, and vice versa. We can-
not decide from our recordings whether the recording over the
preSMA reflected activity in the SMA proper, the preSMA, dorsal
premotor cortex, or dorsomedial prefrontal cortex. All areas could
potentially be involved, but several recent studies have pointed to
the preSMA as the most likely area to be involved in generating
the experience of agency (Fried et al., 1991; Moore et al., 2010).
We find it likely that the observed coupling reflects the ongoing
introspection of the presence or absence of agency imposed by the
experimental setup in this study. This finding is supported by the
lack of difference in any of the kinematic parameters regardless
of whether or not the participants experienced SoA. Since partic-
ipants did not change their motor output, it is unlikely that they
made their decision of SoA during the motor task. They would
appear to depend rather on the subsequent perception and inte-
gration of neural signals. Participants have also been reported to
be unaware of an external perturbation during drawing of a self-
produced line (Fourneret and Jeannerod, 1998). In line with this,
Synofzik and co-workers argued that the acknowledgment and
judgment of SoA is constructed after the motor task has been per-
formed, as it is based on the interpretation of the failure between
predicted vs. performed movement (Synofzik et al., 2013).
We are thus aware that we may have revealed an experimen-
tal artifact with little relevance to everyday motor control where
agency is taken for granted and only noticed by its (rare) absence
(Kuhn et al., 2013). However, this does not change the fact that
the observation reflects a genuine neural mechanism related to
the conscious experience of agency.
FREQUENCY RANGES
Several studies have provided evidence that conscious percep-
tion and attention depend on transient synchronized activity in a
distributed network at frequencies around 30–60Hz (Rodriguez
et al., 1999; Engel et al., 2001; Palva et al., 2005; Melloni et al.,
2007; Siegel et al., 2012).
The increased G-coupling that we observe seems to be a gen-
uine finding specifically related to participants’ perception of
agency, because there are no attentional differences associated
with the two subjective states imposed by the experimental setup.
Furthermore, we base this statement on the fact that there were no
behavioral differences with respect to movement time and reac-
tion time in the two different subjective states, which could have
indicated different attentional load. One study has revealed that
G-power in cingulate motor areas correlates with performance in
a task where participants have to monitor their internal atten-
tional state (Yamagishi and Anderson, 2013). However, this find-
ing was not associated with coupling changes. Neural signatures
of attentional mechanisms are indeed also displayed as top down
modulation of G-band coupling (Siegel et al., 2012). However,
our findings do differ [from what?] in showing increased G-
coupling in a specific network, with a specific directionality of
the coupling. It is not as a top-down controlled mechanism,
but rather as a modulation of the bottom-up information giving
the flow direction, i.e., from IPC to preSMA, which is in con-
trast to the more generalized long-distance synchrony observed in
the previous studies (Melloni et al., 2007) reflecting a top-down
attentional modulation (Siegel et al., 2012). The more generalized
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long-distance synchrony in the G-band is probably linked to non-
specific conscious awareness or attentional top downmechanisms
rather than to processing of specific features of the perceived
sensorimotor information. It is likely that conscious detection
of other specific sensory features will reveal a specific coupling
in different relevant local circuitries similar to what we have
seen here.
As seen in Supplementary Figure S1, the DCMs models the
observed time-frequency content of the two source regions quite
well. Importantly it is also evident that the two regions display
quite different tempero-frequency dynamics in all participants,
suggesting, that coupling is not due to common noise signals in
the two regions.
LIMITATIONS TO OUR STUDY
Unfortunately it was not possible to have a single deviation
degree that gave rise to a 50/50 distribution of AgencyYES and
AgencyNO responses in all participants, and we were therefore
forced to collapse all trials across different deviation angles. This
will naturally give rise to more small angle (i.e., +/−1◦) devia-
tions in the AgencyYES condition and large angle (i.e., +/−6◦)
deviations in the AgencyNO conditions. However, we do not
believe that the difference in coupling between AgencyYES and
AgencyNO is a reflection of purely larger visual deviations (+/−1
vs. 6◦). As the deviation is initiated shortly after the movement
starts, we would also have seen a similar difference in coupling
for the early task phase where the visual deviation also is present.
DCM implies causality at the structural level, which means
that causality is inferred by how the state equations of the DCM
are coupled, and not by temporal precedence of activity in one
area and then later in another area. If there is, as we suggest, a
different causal relation between the investigated regions in the
early and late task phases, it would not have been possible to inte-
grate that into one large DCM covering the full time window of
the task. This means that it would not be possible to integrate the
dynamics of the whole task into a single model, if one expects
that the directional communication changes throughout the task.
Therefore, the approach with the split of the data into an early
and a late task phase was employed.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion our observations are consistent with the idea that
the sense of agency ismainly determined post-hoc based on a com-
parison between the sensory consequences of the movement and
the original intention, rather than the ongoing experience during
the movement (Kawato and Wolpert, 1998). The sudden absence
of agency that we may experience when our interaction with the
environment is suddenly altered (defective computer mouse or
defective steering in a car) may then be signaled by the absence
of high G coupled activity in IPC and preSMA, when comparison
of sensory feedback and motor plan reveals that the desired target
was not obtained. This idea requires further testing.
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